feat(fase-13): admin RPCs + server_settings + section_enabled server layer
Migration 025 adds:
- collectives.deleted_at column for soft delete (app-level visibility;
RLS does NOT enforce soft-delete invisibility — admin area surfaces
everything by design).
- server_settings(key text pk, value jsonb) — generic admin-write bag
seeded with an empty 'default_sections' row.
- section_enabled() extended with the server layer as the topmost
coalesce branch. Final precedence: server > collective > user > true.
- Privileged RPCs: grant_/revoke_server_admin (last-admin guard fires
P0003), admin_list_collectives, admin_soft_delete_collective,
admin_restore_collective, admin_hard_delete_collective (30-day or
p_force=true), admin_remove_member, admin_set_default_section
(rejects unknown sections via known_sections() lookup).
- _log_admin_action(): private helper centralising the
audit INSERT, called by every privileged RPC BEFORE the mutation.
Migration 024 RLS policy on server_admins rewritten to delegate the
admin branch to is_server_admin() (SECURITY DEFINER, bypasses RLS) —
the original inline EXISTS hit infinite recursion (caught empirically
with `SET ROLE authenticated`).
22 new pgTAP assertions cover schema shape, RPC signatures, the
SECURITY DEFINER posture of every admin function, the new deleted_at
column, and the server-layer precedence semantics for section_enabled.
10 new Vitest integration tests (SA-01..SA-10) cover:
- admin_list_collectives gated for non-admins (P0001 'forbidden').
- soft / restore / hard delete audit + state transitions.
- hard-delete recency guard (not_soft_deleted, too_recent, force).
- hard-delete cascade is non-destructive to public.users.
- remove_member writes role_was + reason to audit payload.
- set_default_section rejects unknown sections; patches JSONB
without clobbering siblings.
- grant/revoke with last-admin guard (revoking the sole admin
raises P0003 'last_admin'; failed call does NOT write audit).
- section_enabled precedence walked layer by layer in one client.
- RLS: non-admin sees zero rows in admin_actions + server_admins.
packages/types/src/database.ts hand-extended with the new tables and
RPC signatures; collectives Row/Insert/Update get deleted_at.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -30,17 +30,13 @@ CREATE TABLE public.server_admins (
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ALTER TABLE public.server_admins ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- A user can always read their own row (so the client can compute
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-- $isServerAdmin without escalation); other admins can read the full list.
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-- No INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policy — only SECURITY DEFINER RPCs touch this.
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CREATE POLICY "select_self_or_admin" ON public.server_admins
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FOR SELECT
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USING (
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user_id = auth.uid()
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OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM public.server_admins WHERE user_id = auth.uid())
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);
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-- ── is_server_admin() ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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-- Declared BEFORE the RLS policy so the policy can call it. The function is
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-- SECURITY DEFINER → it bypasses RLS on `server_admins`, which is the only way
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-- to break the otherwise-recursive policy ("you can see rows if you ARE in
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-- this table" → the inner SELECT triggers the same policy → infinite
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-- recursion, observed empirically before this rewrite).
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--
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-- The default-arg form lets RLS-style call-sites write `is_server_admin()` and
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-- get `auth.uid()` for free, matching the shape of `is_admin()` / `is_member()`
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-- from migration 003.
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@@ -62,6 +58,18 @@ COMMENT ON FUNCTION public.is_server_admin(uuid) IS
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.is_server_admin(uuid) FROM PUBLIC;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.is_server_admin(uuid) TO anon, authenticated;
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-- A user can always read their own row (so the client can compute
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-- $isServerAdmin without escalation); other admins can read the full list.
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-- The admin branch uses is_server_admin() — NOT an inline EXISTS — to bypass
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-- the otherwise-recursive RLS evaluation (see function comment above).
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-- No INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policy — only SECURITY DEFINER RPCs touch this.
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CREATE POLICY "select_self_or_admin" ON public.server_admins
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FOR SELECT
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USING (
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user_id = auth.uid()
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OR public.is_server_admin()
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);
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-- ── admin_actions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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-- Append-only audit log. Every privileged RPC in migration 025 writes one
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-- row before mutating state. `actor_id` is RESTRICT so the audit trail
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513
supabase/migrations/025_admin_rpcs.sql
Normal file
513
supabase/migrations/025_admin_rpcs.sql
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,513 @@
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-- Migration 025: server admin RPCs + server_settings + section_enabled() server layer (Fase 13.2)
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--
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-- Every privileged RPC follows the same shape:
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-- 1. SECURITY DEFINER.
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-- 2. Pull v_actor := auth.uid() (NULL → 'unauthenticated' / errcode 28000).
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-- 3. `if not public.is_server_admin(v_actor) then raise 'forbidden' using errcode = 'P0001';`
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-- 4. Validate args (raise '<reason>' using errcode = '22023' for bad input).
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-- 5. INSERT into public.admin_actions BEFORE the mutation (so a failing
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-- mutation still leaves a trace). The audit row + the mutation share one
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-- transaction (the RPC body is implicit).
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-- 6. Perform the mutation; return a void or the affected rows.
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--
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-- The `is_server_admin()` call short-circuits on the (PK-indexed) lookup so the
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-- guard is sub-millisecond.
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--
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-- ── deleted_at on collectives ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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-- Soft delete. The plan keeps the original SELECT/UPDATE RLS policies untouched
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-- — non-admin members of a soft-deleted collective WILL still see it in
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-- queries unless callers add `WHERE deleted_at IS NULL`. We document the
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-- contract here: the RLS layer does not enforce soft-delete invisibility,
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-- the app layer does. The /admin area surfaces all rows including deleted ones.
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-- Hard-delete (cascade) is the operator's escape valve for permanent removal.
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ALTER TABLE public.collectives
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ADD COLUMN deleted_at timestamptz NULL;
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COMMENT ON COLUMN public.collectives.deleted_at IS
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'Set by admin_soft_delete_collective; cleared by admin_restore_collective. '
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'NULL = active. App-level callers MUST filter on this where soft-delete '
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'invisibility matters — RLS does not enforce it.';
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-- ── server_settings ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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-- Generic key/jsonb-value bag. First use: 'default_sections' jsonb of
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-- {section: bool} consumed by section_enabled(). Adding new server-level
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-- settings is a row insert, not a schema change.
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CREATE TABLE public.server_settings (
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key text PRIMARY KEY,
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value jsonb NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
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updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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updated_by uuid NULL REFERENCES public.users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
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);
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ALTER TABLE public.server_settings ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- Everyone can READ server_settings (section_enabled() needs to evaluate it
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-- from a normal user session). Writes go through admin_set_default_section()
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-- under SECURITY DEFINER — no INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policy.
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CREATE POLICY "select_all" ON public.server_settings
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FOR SELECT
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USING (true);
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COMMENT ON TABLE public.server_settings IS
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'Server-level key/value bag. Read by everyone, written only by admin RPCs.';
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-- Seed an empty default_sections row so section_enabled never sees a missing
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-- row vs missing key difference (both behave as "no opinion" anyway, but the
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-- presence of the row keeps PostgREST queries on this single record cheap).
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INSERT INTO public.server_settings (key, value)
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VALUES ('default_sections', '{}'::jsonb)
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ON CONFLICT (key) DO NOTHING;
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-- ── section_enabled() extension ────────────────────────────────────────────
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-- Prepend a server layer. Precedence becomes:
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-- server (server_settings.default_sections[p_section])
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-- > collective (collectives.feature_flags[p_section])
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-- > user (users.feature_flags[p_section])
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-- > default true
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-- This is the one-line diff that migration 023 was designed for; the rest of
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-- the function body is untouched.
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.section_enabled(
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p_section text,
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p_user uuid,
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p_collective uuid
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)
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RETURNS boolean
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LANGUAGE sql
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STABLE
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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SELECT COALESCE(
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(SELECT (value ->> p_section)::boolean
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FROM public.server_settings
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WHERE key = 'default_sections'),
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(SELECT (feature_flags ->> p_section)::boolean
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FROM public.collectives
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WHERE id = p_collective),
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(SELECT (feature_flags ->> p_section)::boolean
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FROM public.users
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WHERE id = p_user),
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true
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);
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$$;
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COMMENT ON FUNCTION public.section_enabled(text, uuid, uuid) IS
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'Effective ON/OFF of a top-level section for (user, collective). '
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'Precedence: server > collective > user > default true.';
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-- ── Helper: internal audit writer ──────────────────────────────────────────
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-- Centralises the INSERT INTO admin_actions so RPCs read cleanly. NOT exposed
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-- to anyone — only the other SECURITY DEFINER functions in this file call it.
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public._log_admin_action(
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p_actor uuid,
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p_action text,
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p_target_type text,
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p_target_id uuid,
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p_payload jsonb DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb
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)
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RETURNS void
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LANGUAGE sql
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VOLATILE
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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INSERT INTO public.admin_actions (actor_id, action, target_type, target_id, payload)
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VALUES (p_actor, p_action, p_target_type, p_target_id, p_payload);
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$$;
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public._log_admin_action(uuid, text, text, uuid, jsonb) FROM PUBLIC;
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-- No GRANT; only invoked by sibling functions in the same migration.
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-- ── grant_server_admin ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.grant_server_admin(p_user uuid)
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RETURNS void
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LANGUAGE plpgsql
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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DECLARE
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v_actor uuid := auth.uid();
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BEGIN
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IF v_actor IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'unauthenticated' USING ERRCODE = '28000';
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END IF;
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IF NOT public.is_server_admin(v_actor) THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'forbidden' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
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END IF;
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IF p_user IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'user_required' USING ERRCODE = '22023';
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END IF;
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IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM public.users WHERE id = p_user) THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'user_not_found' USING ERRCODE = 'P0002';
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END IF;
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INSERT INTO public.server_admins (user_id, granted_by)
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VALUES (p_user, v_actor)
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ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO NOTHING;
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PERFORM public._log_admin_action(
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v_actor,
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'grant_server_admin',
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'user',
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p_user,
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jsonb_build_object()
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);
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END;
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$$;
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.grant_server_admin(uuid) FROM PUBLIC;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.grant_server_admin(uuid) TO authenticated;
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-- ── revoke_server_admin ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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-- Guard: the last remaining admin cannot be removed (would lock the instance
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-- out of its own admin area irrecoverably).
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.revoke_server_admin(p_user uuid)
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RETURNS void
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LANGUAGE plpgsql
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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DECLARE
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v_actor uuid := auth.uid();
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v_remaining int;
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BEGIN
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IF v_actor IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'unauthenticated' USING ERRCODE = '28000';
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END IF;
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IF NOT public.is_server_admin(v_actor) THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'forbidden' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
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END IF;
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IF p_user IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'user_required' USING ERRCODE = '22023';
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END IF;
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-- Compute remaining admins AFTER hypothetical removal.
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SELECT count(*) INTO v_remaining
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FROM public.server_admins
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WHERE user_id <> p_user;
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IF v_remaining = 0 THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'last_admin' USING ERRCODE = 'P0003';
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END IF;
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DELETE FROM public.server_admins WHERE user_id = p_user;
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PERFORM public._log_admin_action(
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v_actor,
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'revoke_server_admin',
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'user',
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p_user,
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jsonb_build_object()
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);
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END;
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$$;
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.revoke_server_admin(uuid) FROM PUBLIC;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.revoke_server_admin(uuid) TO authenticated;
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-- ── admin_list_collectives ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.admin_list_collectives(
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p_search text DEFAULT NULL,
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p_limit int DEFAULT 50
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)
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RETURNS TABLE (
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id uuid,
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name text,
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emoji text,
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member_count bigint,
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created_at timestamptz,
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deleted_at timestamptz
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)
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LANGUAGE plpgsql
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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DECLARE
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v_actor uuid := auth.uid();
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BEGIN
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IF v_actor IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'unauthenticated' USING ERRCODE = '28000';
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END IF;
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IF NOT public.is_server_admin(v_actor) THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'forbidden' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
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END IF;
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RETURN QUERY
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SELECT c.id,
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c.name,
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c.emoji,
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(SELECT count(*) FROM public.collective_members cm WHERE cm.collective_id = c.id) AS member_count,
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c.created_at,
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c.deleted_at
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FROM public.collectives c
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WHERE p_search IS NULL OR c.name ILIKE '%' || p_search || '%'
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ORDER BY c.deleted_at NULLS FIRST, c.created_at DESC
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LIMIT LEAST(GREATEST(p_limit, 1), 500);
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END;
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$$;
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.admin_list_collectives(text, int) FROM PUBLIC;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.admin_list_collectives(text, int) TO authenticated;
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-- ── admin_soft_delete_collective ───────────────────────────────────────────
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.admin_soft_delete_collective(
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p_collective_id uuid,
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p_reason text
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)
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RETURNS void
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LANGUAGE plpgsql
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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DECLARE
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v_actor uuid := auth.uid();
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BEGIN
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IF v_actor IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'unauthenticated' USING ERRCODE = '28000';
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END IF;
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IF NOT public.is_server_admin(v_actor) THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'forbidden' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
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END IF;
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IF p_collective_id IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'collective_required' USING ERRCODE = '22023';
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END IF;
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IF p_reason IS NULL OR length(btrim(p_reason)) = 0 THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'reason_required' USING ERRCODE = '22023';
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END IF;
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IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM public.collectives WHERE id = p_collective_id) THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'collective_not_found' USING ERRCODE = 'P0002';
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END IF;
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UPDATE public.collectives
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SET deleted_at = now()
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WHERE id = p_collective_id
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AND deleted_at IS NULL;
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PERFORM public._log_admin_action(
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v_actor,
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'soft_delete_collective',
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'collective',
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p_collective_id,
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jsonb_build_object('reason', p_reason)
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);
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END;
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$$;
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.admin_soft_delete_collective(uuid, text) FROM PUBLIC;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.admin_soft_delete_collective(uuid, text) TO authenticated;
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-- ── admin_restore_collective ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.admin_restore_collective(p_collective_id uuid)
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RETURNS void
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LANGUAGE plpgsql
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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DECLARE
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v_actor uuid := auth.uid();
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BEGIN
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IF v_actor IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'unauthenticated' USING ERRCODE = '28000';
|
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END IF;
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IF NOT public.is_server_admin(v_actor) THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'forbidden' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
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END IF;
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IF p_collective_id IS NULL THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'collective_required' USING ERRCODE = '22023';
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END IF;
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IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM public.collectives WHERE id = p_collective_id) THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'collective_not_found' USING ERRCODE = 'P0002';
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END IF;
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UPDATE public.collectives
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SET deleted_at = NULL
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WHERE id = p_collective_id;
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PERFORM public._log_admin_action(
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v_actor,
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'restore_collective',
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'collective',
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p_collective_id,
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jsonb_build_object()
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);
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END;
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$$;
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||||
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.admin_restore_collective(uuid) FROM PUBLIC;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.admin_restore_collective(uuid) TO authenticated;
|
||||
|
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-- ── admin_hard_delete_collective ───────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
-- Guard: only allowed when deleted_at IS NOT NULL AND >= 30 days old, OR
|
||||
-- p_force = true. This protects against accidental "soft-delete then
|
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-- hard-delete by reflex".
|
||||
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.admin_hard_delete_collective(
|
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p_collective_id uuid,
|
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p_force boolean DEFAULT false
|
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)
|
||||
RETURNS void
|
||||
LANGUAGE plpgsql
|
||||
SECURITY DEFINER
|
||||
SET search_path = public
|
||||
AS $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
v_actor uuid := auth.uid();
|
||||
v_row public.collectives%ROWTYPE;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
IF v_actor IS NULL THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'unauthenticated' USING ERRCODE = '28000';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
IF NOT public.is_server_admin(v_actor) THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'forbidden' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
IF p_collective_id IS NULL THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'collective_required' USING ERRCODE = '22023';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
SELECT * INTO v_row FROM public.collectives WHERE id = p_collective_id;
|
||||
IF NOT FOUND THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'collective_not_found' USING ERRCODE = 'P0002';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT p_force THEN
|
||||
IF v_row.deleted_at IS NULL THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'not_soft_deleted' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
IF v_row.deleted_at > now() - INTERVAL '30 days' THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'too_recent' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
-- Audit FIRST so the action row exists even if the cascade somehow trips.
|
||||
PERFORM public._log_admin_action(
|
||||
v_actor,
|
||||
'hard_delete_collective',
|
||||
'collective',
|
||||
p_collective_id,
|
||||
jsonb_build_object(
|
||||
'force', p_force,
|
||||
'name_snapshot', v_row.name,
|
||||
'created_at', v_row.created_at,
|
||||
'deleted_at', v_row.deleted_at
|
||||
)
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
DELETE FROM public.collectives WHERE id = p_collective_id;
|
||||
END;
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.admin_hard_delete_collective(uuid, boolean) FROM PUBLIC;
|
||||
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.admin_hard_delete_collective(uuid, boolean) TO authenticated;
|
||||
|
||||
-- ── admin_remove_member ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.admin_remove_member(
|
||||
p_collective_id uuid,
|
||||
p_user uuid,
|
||||
p_reason text
|
||||
)
|
||||
RETURNS void
|
||||
LANGUAGE plpgsql
|
||||
SECURITY DEFINER
|
||||
SET search_path = public
|
||||
AS $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
v_actor uuid := auth.uid();
|
||||
v_role public.member_role;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
IF v_actor IS NULL THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'unauthenticated' USING ERRCODE = '28000';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
IF NOT public.is_server_admin(v_actor) THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'forbidden' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
IF p_collective_id IS NULL OR p_user IS NULL THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'args_required' USING ERRCODE = '22023';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
IF p_reason IS NULL OR length(btrim(p_reason)) = 0 THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'reason_required' USING ERRCODE = '22023';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
SELECT role INTO v_role
|
||||
FROM public.collective_members
|
||||
WHERE collective_id = p_collective_id AND user_id = p_user;
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT FOUND THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'membership_not_found' USING ERRCODE = 'P0002';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
-- Audit before mutation so we record the role the user used to have.
|
||||
PERFORM public._log_admin_action(
|
||||
v_actor,
|
||||
'remove_member',
|
||||
'collective_member',
|
||||
p_collective_id,
|
||||
jsonb_build_object('user_id', p_user, 'role_was', v_role, 'reason', p_reason)
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
DELETE FROM public.collective_members
|
||||
WHERE collective_id = p_collective_id AND user_id = p_user;
|
||||
END;
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.admin_remove_member(uuid, uuid, text) FROM PUBLIC;
|
||||
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.admin_remove_member(uuid, uuid, text) TO authenticated;
|
||||
|
||||
-- ── admin_set_default_section ──────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
-- Patches public.server_settings(key='default_sections') so the section
|
||||
-- toggle applies as the server-layer override read by section_enabled().
|
||||
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.admin_set_default_section(
|
||||
p_section text,
|
||||
p_enabled boolean
|
||||
)
|
||||
RETURNS void
|
||||
LANGUAGE plpgsql
|
||||
SECURITY DEFINER
|
||||
SET search_path = public
|
||||
AS $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
v_actor uuid := auth.uid();
|
||||
v_current jsonb;
|
||||
v_next jsonb;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
IF v_actor IS NULL THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'unauthenticated' USING ERRCODE = '28000';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
IF NOT public.is_server_admin(v_actor) THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'forbidden' USING ERRCODE = 'P0001';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
IF p_section IS NULL OR p_section = '' THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'section_required' USING ERRCODE = '22023';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
-- Reject unknown sections to prevent typos from silently shaping the
|
||||
-- visibility surface forever. Future sections require a migration that
|
||||
-- updates known_sections() (see migration 023 comment).
|
||||
IF NOT (p_section = ANY (public.known_sections())) THEN
|
||||
RAISE EXCEPTION 'unknown_section: %', p_section USING ERRCODE = '22023';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
-- Read-modify-write the JSONB row. CONCURRENT writes are not a real
|
||||
-- concern here (admin UI, low frequency); a row-level lock from the
|
||||
-- UPDATE-RETURNING below is sufficient.
|
||||
INSERT INTO public.server_settings (key, value, updated_by, updated_at)
|
||||
VALUES ('default_sections', jsonb_build_object(p_section, p_enabled), v_actor, now())
|
||||
ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE
|
||||
SET value = public.server_settings.value || jsonb_build_object(p_section, p_enabled),
|
||||
updated_by = v_actor,
|
||||
updated_at = now()
|
||||
RETURNING value INTO v_next;
|
||||
|
||||
PERFORM public._log_admin_action(
|
||||
v_actor,
|
||||
'set_default_section',
|
||||
'server_setting',
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
jsonb_build_object('section', p_section, 'enabled', p_enabled, 'value_after', v_next)
|
||||
);
|
||||
END;
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.admin_set_default_section(text, boolean) FROM PUBLIC;
|
||||
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.admin_set_default_section(text, boolean) TO authenticated;
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user