Oier Bravo Urtasun
2db5aaac14
Closes the deferrals from Fase 4 that gated a public deploy of the MVP.
PWA install
- Custom SW at apps/web/src/sw.ts (named sw.ts, not service-worker.ts, so
SvelteKit doesn't intercept it and block Workbox imports).
- vite.config.ts switched to injectManifest strategy with precache of the
built shell; no runtime caching of Supabase (offline writes stay on the
existing $lib/sync pending_ops queue).
- Root +layout.svelte onMount() calls registerSW({ immediate: true }) from
virtual:pwa-register — the plugin does not auto-register.
- Web manifest with 192/512/512-maskable icons + iOS meta tags
(apple-mobile-web-app-capable, apple-touch-icon, etc.) in app.html.
- Placeholder icons generated via ImageMagick; replace before public launch
(noted in apps/web/static/icons/README.md).
Kong rate-limit
- /rest/v1/collective_invitations POST: 20/hour per Authorization header.
Anti-spam on invitation creation is the only rate-limit that survived —
auth rate-limits were dropped during execution (see plan §6.3): Keycloak
already provides bruteForceProtected=true on the realm, and stacking a
Kong limit on /auth/v1/token throttled legitimate PKCE code exchanges
during E2E.
- Added 'rate-limiting' to KONG_PLUGINS in docker-compose.dev.yml.
- Discovered: strip_path=true on a full-table path sends "/" upstream and
PostgREST rejects POST to root with PGRST117. Route carries a
request-transformer plugin that rewrites the URI back.
JWT rotation + prod template
- infra/scripts/rotate-jwt.sh signs anon + service_role JWTs with a fresh
48-byte secret via openssl. Prints three values for the operator to
paste; does not touch files.
- Dev secret rotated as a dry-run. Updated both .env (local, gitignored)
and apps/web/.env.development. Existing sessions are invalidated — all
users must re-login once.
- .env.production.example committed with placeholders + rotation notes.
Lighthouse + RLS audit tooling
- `just lighthouse` boots the prod build + Supabase stack and runs
lighthouse CLI against PWA/A11y/Best-Practices.
- `just rls-audit` runs infra/scripts/rls-audit.sh which signs an Eva JWT
(non-member) and GETs 8 REST endpoints — all must return []. Complements
the Vitest rls-audit.test.ts suite.
Tests
- 236 green: 34 pgTAP + 140 Vitest integration + 15 unit + 46 Playwright.
- 1 rate-limit test gated behind RUN_RATE_LIMIT_TESTS=1 (Kong counters are
shared state); run via `just test-rate-limit` which force-recreates Kong
first to reset counters.
- 3 skipped in `just test-all` (2 Realtime presence upstream bug, 1 gated
rate-limit).
Deliberately out of scope: push notifications, CI ephemeral Docker, final
production icons, runtime caching of Supabase (SyncBanner + pending_ops
already covers offline).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
50 lines
2.9 KiB
Plaintext
50 lines
2.9 KiB
Plaintext
# Production environment template for Colectivo.
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# Copy to /srv/colectivo/.env on the production host and fill in the secrets.
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# NEVER commit the filled version.
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# ── Database ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<openssl rand -base64 32>
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# ── Supabase signing key ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Regenerate every 90 days (or immediately on a suspected leak).
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# Use infra/scripts/rotate-jwt.sh to produce the matching anon + service-role
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# JWTs; it signs both with the secret below, so they must stay in sync.
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SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET=<openssl rand -base64 48 | tr -d '\n'>
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# JWTs signed with the secret above. Produced by infra/scripts/rotate-jwt.sh.
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# Don't hand-edit these — run the script, copy its output.
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PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=<signed by rotate-jwt.sh>
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SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY=<signed by rotate-jwt.sh>
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# ── Public URLs (production domain + subdomain) ───────────────────────────
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PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL=https://api.example.com
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PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_URL=https://auth.example.com
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PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_REALM=colectivo
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PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID=colectivo-web
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PUBLIC_APP_URL=https://app.example.com
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# ── Keycloak ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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KEYCLOAK_ADMIN=admin
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KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=<openssl rand -base64 24>
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# Client secret for the confidential OAuth client; must match the Keycloak
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# realm export.
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KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET=<openssl rand -base64 32>
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# ── Email (Resend) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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RESEND_API_KEY=re_...
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RESEND_FROM_EMAIL=noreply@example.com
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# ── Backup storage (Backblaze B2) ─────────────────────────────────────────
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B2_BUCKET_NAME=colectivo-prod-backups
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B2_APPLICATION_KEY_ID=<from Backblaze>
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B2_APPLICATION_KEY=<from Backblaze>
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# ── Supabase Studio ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Basic-auth on the admin UI. Narrow to internal IPs via nginx when possible.
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DASHBOARD_USERNAME=<pick>
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DASHBOARD_PASSWORD=<openssl rand -base64 24>
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# ── Deploy target ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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DEPLOY_HOST=deploy@prod.example.com
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DEPLOY_PATH=/srv/colectivo
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