Oier Bravo Urtasun
0485ccc75e
Wraps Fase 13:
- docs/history/fase-13-server-admin.md captures the full fase
breakdown (model, RPCs, UI, store wiring, tests, verification,
deviations from plan, scope out).
- docs/deployment.md gains a Server administration section with the
SERVER_ADMIN_EMAIL bootstrap recipe + the "first prod boot has no
users yet" gotcha + manual re-run command (with the </dev/null
redirect for the heredoc-stdin gotcha) + last-admin guard note +
audit log query snippet.
- CLAUDE.md "Project Status" updated: MVP2 now 5/6, Fase 13 ✅, test
totals, the one pre-existing SV-02 flake noted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
112 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
112 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
# Deployment
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## Production stack — ambrosio (OVH VPS)
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Live URL: **https://erosi.limonia.net** (app + Supabase API, single-domain). Keycloak is external — its URL is set via `PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_URL` in `/opt/colectivo/.env`. OVH VPS, Ubuntu 24, Docker 29.
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- `infra/docker-compose.erosi.yml` — full stack (db, auth, rest, realtime, storage, imgproxy, kong, app, caddy). `studio`, `meta`, and the bundled `keycloak` service are intentionally absent. All services live on a single internal Docker network (`colectivo`); nothing on the stack is bound to a public network or labeled for an external reverse proxy.
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- **Internal edge — Caddy on `:3000`**: `infra/Caddyfile.erosi` does the path split — `/rest/v1`, `/auth/v1`, `/realtime/v1`, `/storage/v1`, `/graphql/v1`, `/pg` → `kong:8000`; everything else → `app:3000`. WebSockets pass through (Caddy's `reverse_proxy` handles upgrade headers). Plain HTTP, no TLS. The container publishes host port 3000 (`ports: ["3000:3000"]`). Global block sets `auto_https off` + `admin off`, so the only listening socket is `:3000` — no ACME, no admin API.
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- **External reverse proxy + TLS** are owned outside this repo (originally NetBird's self-hosted Traefik on ambrosio). Whatever proxy fronts the host terminates TLS for `erosi.limonia.net` and forwards plain HTTP to `ambrosio:3000`. Repo has no labels, no Traefik network attachment, no cert config — only the bind on `:3000`.
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- `infra/scripts/deploy-erosi.sh` — idempotent redeploy: rsync → on first run generate secrets + write `/opt/colectivo/.env` with placeholders the operator fills in (`PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_URL`, `KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET`) → subsequent runs fail fast if any placeholder is unfilled → docker compose build + up → apply pending migrations. Never touches `/etc/caddy/*`, never runs `sudo`. Note: bind-mounted files (e.g. `Caddyfile.erosi`) require `docker compose restart caddy` after editing — the script's `up -d` only recreates services whose compose definition changed.
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- `keycloak/realm-export.erosi.json` — **not imported** by this stack (no bundled Keycloak). Kept as reference for what the external Keycloak client must have — realm name, client id, and client secret are operator-chosen and wired in via `.env` (`PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_REALM`, `PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID`, `KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET`), so the file's literal `colectivo-web` / `colectivo` values are illustrative, not required. What the client must actually have: `redirectUris: ["https://erosi.limonia.net/*", "https://erosi.limonia.net/auth/v1/callback"]`, `webOrigins: ["https://erosi.limonia.net"]`, confidential, `openid` as a default client scope with `include.in.token.scope=true`.
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- `.env.erosi.example` — committed template. The real `/opt/colectivo/.env` on ambrosio is 600 and stays on the server.
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## Pre-deploy prerequisites
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1. **External Keycloak** reachable from ambrosio's Docker network (outbound HTTPS). Realm + confidential client configured as described above; `.env` gets `PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_URL`, `PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_REALM`, `PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID`, `KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET`. **If the Keycloak deployment uses the legacy `/auth/` base path** (Keycloak ≤ 16 default; some distributions still carry it — `auth.fosil.eu` is one) then `PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_URL` must include it, e.g. `https://auth.example.com/auth`. Verify by opening `${PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_URL}/realms/${PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_REALM}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — it should return 200 JSON; 404 means the base path is wrong.
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2. **Users in the external Keycloak must match existing `auth.users` UUIDs** (`auth.users.id = keycloak sub`) or the stack starts fresh with no prior users. Re-registering produces new sub UUIDs; either re-seed `auth.users` + `auth.identities` or wipe and start over.
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3. **External proxy idle timeout** — Realtime WebSockets stay open for the entire shopping session, so whatever fronts the host must allow long-lived idle connections. NetBird's installer sets `--entryPoints.websecure.transport.respondingTimeouts.idleTimeout=0` (unlimited) by default; if the external proxy is something else, configure ≥3600s on the relevant entrypoint. Symptom of a too-short timeout: client reconnects continuously mid-session.
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4. **External proxy upstream** — forward `erosi.limonia.net` (HTTPS, terminate TLS there) to `ambrosio:3000` (plain HTTP). One upstream is enough; Caddy inside the stack does the kong-vs-app path split.
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5. **DNS** for `erosi.limonia.net` → ambrosio (A/AAAA).
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6. **Host Caddy disabled**: `sudo systemctl stop caddy && sudo systemctl disable caddy`. Without `disable`, the unit comes back on reboot and races the external proxy for 80/443. Remove any `# BEGIN colectivo-erosi … # END` block from `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` for tidiness. (The internal Caddy inside the stack runs in a container on `:3000` and is unrelated to this host unit.)
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## Prod-specific fixes
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Had to be made for the stack to boot cleanly on a fresh volume:
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- `infra/db-init/00-role-passwords.sh` — rewrote as idempotent bootstrap (see the "supabase/postgres doesn't bootstrap Supabase roles" gotcha in `CLAUDE.md`): creates all Supabase service roles if absent, enables `pg_cron` + `pgcrypto` + `uuid-ossp`, creates `auth` / `storage` / `graphql_public` / `_realtime` / `realtime` schemas + empty `supabase_realtime` publication, sets `supabase_auth_admin` search_path to `auth`. The old `00-role-passwords.sql` (ALTER-only) has been removed.
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- `apps/web/vite.config.ts` — PWA strategy switched `injectManifest` → `generateSW` (see the "injectManifest hardcoded filename" gotcha in `CLAUDE.md`).
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## Runbook
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### App build hang / PostHog timeout
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The `app` image's final build stage (`pnpm --filter @colectivo/web build` → vite SSR) occasionally stalls during `transforming...` and ~9 minutes later dies with `UnhandledPromiseRejection: "Timeout while shutting down PostHog"`. Intermittent; reproducible across rebuilds with the same layer cache.
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Fix: rebuild with `--no-cache` once:
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```sh
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ssh ambrosio 'cd /opt/colectivo && docker compose --env-file .env -f infra/docker-compose.erosi.yml build --no-cache app'
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```
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Subsequent normal builds succeed. Run inside `tmux` if you're on a flaky SSH link — the no-cache build takes 5–15 minutes and losing the connection kills BuildKit.
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### Changing `PUBLIC_*` env values (URL, realm, client id)
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Any change to `PUBLIC_APP_URL`, `PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL`, `PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_URL`, `PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_REALM`, `PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID` requires an **app rebuild** (those values are baked into the client bundle at build time via `docker-compose.erosi.yml` build args). After editing `.env`:
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```sh
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ssh ambrosio 'cd /opt/colectivo && docker compose --env-file .env -f infra/docker-compose.erosi.yml build app && docker compose --env-file .env -f infra/docker-compose.erosi.yml up -d'
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```
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`KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET` is runtime-only (GoTrue reads it) — for that one a `docker compose restart auth` is enough.
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### Wipe all app + auth data (keep schema, keep migrations)
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When switching Keycloak realms or starting fresh:
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```sql
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BEGIN;
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TRUNCATE TABLE public.notes, public.tasks, public.task_lists,
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public.shopping_items, public.shopping_lists, public.item_frequency,
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public.collective_invitations, public.collective_members, public.collectives,
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public.users
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RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE;
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TRUNCATE TABLE auth.refresh_tokens, auth.sessions, auth.identities, auth.users
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RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE;
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COMMIT;
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```
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CASCADE also empties `auth.mfa_factors`, `auth.mfa_amr_claims`, `auth.mfa_challenges`, `auth.one_time_tokens` — expected. Never touch `auth.schema_migrations` or `public._applied_migrations` (they track what DDL has been applied).
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## Server administration (Fase 13)
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The instance has a global `server_admin` role separate from the per-collective `admin` role. Server admins can list/soft-delete/restore/hard-delete any collective, remove members, set server-level section visibility defaults, and read the append-only audit log at `/admin/audit`.
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### Promoting the first admin
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Set `SERVER_ADMIN_EMAIL` in `.env` to the operator's email BEFORE first deploy. `infra/db-init/10-server-admin-seed.sh` runs once on first volume init and inserts the matching user into `public.server_admins`.
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**Gotcha**: `docker-entrypoint-initdb.d` fires before any user has signed in via Keycloak, so `public.users` is empty and the script will log `WARNING: no public.users row matches email <...>, skipping`. To actually bootstrap:
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1. Bring up the stack normally (`docker compose --env-file .env -f infra/docker-compose.erosi.yml up -d`).
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2. Sign in once via Keycloak using `SERVER_ADMIN_EMAIL` to populate `public.users`.
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3. Re-run the bootstrap script manually:
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```bash
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docker compose -f infra/docker-compose.erosi.yml exec -T db \
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bash /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/10-server-admin-seed.sh </dev/null
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```
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The `</dev/null` redirect is mandatory per the heredoc-stdin gotcha (the surrounding bash heredoc on the SSH side would otherwise be drained).
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After this `server_admins` is non-empty and the script is a no-op forever.
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### Promoting subsequent admins
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Use `/admin/admins` → "Promote user" with the target's email. Or directly in SQL:
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```sql
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INSERT INTO public.server_admins (user_id, granted_by)
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SELECT id, '<your-user-id>'::uuid FROM public.users WHERE email = '<target>'
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ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO NOTHING;
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```
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### Last-admin guard
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`revoke_server_admin()` refuses to remove the only remaining admin (`P0003 'last_admin'`). If you really need to demote the last admin (e.g. handover), promote the replacement FIRST.
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### Audit log
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Every privileged RPC writes to `public.admin_actions`. Read it from `/admin/audit` or with:
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```sql
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SELECT created_at, actor_id, action, target_type, target_id, payload
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FROM public.admin_actions ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 100;
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```
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The log is append-only via RLS — there are no INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policies, only the SECURITY DEFINER RPCs can write. A `postgres` superuser shell can still delete rows; the threat model is "malicious admin via the product UI", not "operator with DB access".
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## Not yet configured on ambrosio
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- SMTP (Resend)
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- Automated backups — script exists at `infra/scripts/backup.sh`, not scheduled
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- Lighthouse run against prod URL
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- Final production icons
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