Oier Bravo Urtasun
10b86ae23e
The SPA computes its redirect origin as (force_ssl ? "https://" : "http://") + general.host. With host set to "https://files.${BASE_DOMAIN}" that produced "http://https://files.ulicraft.net", so every client-side redirect broke and the page never routed anywhere. Server-side this was invisible: SecureOrigin strips the scheme before the Host check, so `curl /` returned 200, the API answered, and the uptime monitor stayed green — only real browsers failed. The tell is a `POST /report?...msg=Redirecting to http://https://...` line in the log. Set host to the bare hostname and force_ssl=true (which the origin needs to build https://, and which only emits an HSTS header — it does not redirect, so it can't loop behind the plain-http nginx→caddy hop). Verified: origin is now "https://files.ulicraft.net"; login + ls still work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
204 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
204 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
# 20 — Filestash (`files.${BASE_DOMAIN}`)
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> Web file share for player media (screenshots, schematics, maps, guides).
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> One [Filestash](https://github.com/mickael-kerjean/filestash) container behind
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> caddy, **one shared username/password for everybody**, **writable**.
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> Config is rendered read-only from a template, like drasl/nmsr.
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>
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> **Not** a backup browser, **not** a mod mirror. See "What goes in it".
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>
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> Everything below was verified against the real image (digest pinned in
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> compose) and against the upstream source, not inferred from the docs — the
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> docs omit most of it.
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## Shape
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```
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Internet ── host nginx (TLS, LE cert for files.) ──► caddy ──► filestash:8334
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│
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${FILES_DATA_DIR} ──┘ (bind mount)
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```
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| Thing | Value |
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|---|---|
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| Vhost | `files.${BASE_DOMAIN}` |
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| Image | `machines/filestash` **pinned by digest** (upstream ships only `latest`) |
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| Container port | `8334`, runs as **uid/gid 1000** (`filestash`) |
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| Auth | htpasswd, **one shared account**, `FILES_USER` / `FILES_PASSWORD_HASH` |
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| Access | read **+ write** for anyone with the password |
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| Data | `${FILES_DATA_DIR}` on the host, **outside the repo** |
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| State | named volume `filestash_state` → `/app/data/state` |
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| Config | `filestash/config.json` rendered from `.tmpl`, mounted `:ro` |
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| Backups | **none** — outside mc-backup's scope. Treat as disposable. |
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| Quota | none — eyeballed |
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## Decisions (settled — don't relitigate)
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**Auth is htpasswd with one shared credential, not SSO.** Filestash's OIDC and
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SAML middlewares are **enterprise-only**; the community build compiles in
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`htpasswd`, `ldap`, `passthrough`, `wordpress`, `local` only (verified in
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`server/plugin/index.go`). Keycloak was considered and dropped — it would need an
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oauth2-proxy sidecar in front + `passthrough`. That path stays open but is not
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built.
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**One instance, everything behind the password.** No anonymous read tier.
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Filestash's auth middleware is **global to the instance**, so "anonymous read +
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authenticated write" is impossible in one container (that's the enterprise
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RBAC). A two-instance split was designed and rejected as not worth it.
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**`FILES_AUTH=none` is gated on the host being internal-only.** The off-switch
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exists for when this server moves behind a LAN/VPN. **Do not set it while
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`files.` is internet-reachable** — auth-off on a *writable* public share is an
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open upload relay: someone parks malware or a phishing kit on your domain, under
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your LE cert, and the abuse mail, the bandwidth, and a possible domain
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blocklisting (which would take `auth.` and the apex down with it, breaking logins
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and the launcher for every player) all land on you. `render-config.sh` prints a
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loud warning when it renders this mode.
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**Shared credential ⇒ no audit trail, no per-person revocation.** You will never
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know who deleted a folder; rotating means re-telling everyone. Fine for a
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friends' media share — but nothing here is backed up, so treat the share as
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disposable and keep anything you'd miss elsewhere.
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## What goes in it
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| Content | Verdict |
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| Screenshots, schematics, maps, guides | ✅ the point |
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| World downloads / `./backups/*.tgz` | ❌ contains `playerdata/`, `stats/`, the full map — every player's inventory and coords, handed to anyone with the shared password |
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| Mods / jars | ❌ redistribution; `distribution.${BASE_DOMAIN}` already serves the modset to launchers |
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## `.env`
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See `.env.example` for the annotated block. Summary:
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| Var | What |
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|---|---|
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| `FILES_DATA_DIR` | host path of the share, outside the repo |
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| `FILES_MOUNT_MODE` | literal mount flag, `rw` \| `ro` |
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| `FILES_AUTH` | `htpasswd` \| `passthrough` \| `none` |
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| `FILES_USER` | shared login name |
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| `FILES_PASSWORD_HASH` | **`$6$`**, from `openssl passwd -6 '<pw>'` |
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| `FILES_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH` | bcrypt, from `docker run --rm caddy:alpine caddy hash-password --plaintext '<pw>'` |
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| `FILES_SECRET_KEY` | `openssl rand -hex 16`, must be non-empty |
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| `FILES_LOCAL_SECRET` | `openssl rand -hex 24`, unlocks the local backend |
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| `LE_SUBDOMAINS` | must include `files` |
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`filestash/config.json` is **rendered and gitignored** — it holds every hash and
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both secrets. Only the `.tmpl` is tracked.
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## Deploy
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```sh
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tooling/render-config.sh # -> filestash/config.json (validates the JSON)
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tooling/issue-letsencrypt.sh # picks up `files` from LE_SUBDOMAINS
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tooling/render-nginx.sh --install # adds the files. vhost + reloads nginx
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mkdir -p "$FILES_DATA_DIR" # uid 1000 must be able to write it
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docker compose up -d filestash caddy
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```
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Then add an Uptime Kuma HTTP monitor for `https://files.${BASE_DOMAIN}` (expect
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`200` — the login page is a 200) and put it on the status page with the others.
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## Gotchas (all of these were hit for real)
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### The `local` backend is admin-gated — this is the one that wastes an evening
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`plg_backend_local.Init()` **refuses to start** unless the connection params
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carry `$LOCAL_BACKEND_SECRET` or the bcrypt admin password. Miss it and every
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login dies at `backend error - Not Allowed`, which reads like a credentials
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problem and isn't. `config.json`'s `attribute_mapping` injects the secret
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server-side (Filestash calls this the "facade pattern"), so players never see it.
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`FILES_LOCAL_SECRET` must be **identical** in the compose env and the rendered
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config — `render-config.sh` renders both from the same var.
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### `$2y$` bcrypt silently fails every login
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The htpasswd plugin's bcrypt branch matches on the literal prefix **`$2a$`**.
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`htpasswd -B` emits `$2y$`, which falls through to `return false` — so every
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login fails with correct credentials and no useful log line. Use
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**`openssl passwd -6`** (`$6$`, sha512) for `FILES_PASSWORD_HASH`.
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`render-config.sh` hard-fails on a `$2y$`/`$2b$` hash rather than shipping a
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config nobody can log into. (The *admin* password is checked by Go's bcrypt
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directly, which does accept `$2y$` — but `caddy hash-password` gives `$2a$`
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anyway, so just use that for both.)
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### `general.host` is a BARE HOSTNAME — a scheme breaks the browser only
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`"host": "files.ulicraft.net"`, **not** `"https://files.ulicraft.net"`, plus
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`"force_ssl": true`. The SPA computes its redirect origin as
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`(force_ssl ? "https://" : "http://") + host`, so a scheme in `host` yields
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**`http://https://files.ulicraft.net`** and every client-side redirect dies —
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the page loads, then silently fails to route anywhere.
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The vicious part: the server-side Host check (`SecureOrigin`) **strips** the
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scheme before comparing, so the server is perfectly happy. `curl /` returns 200,
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the API answers, and the Uptime Kuma monitor stays green — **only real browsers
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break**. Symptom in the log is a `POST /report?...msg=Redirecting to
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http://https://...` line. Hit this on 2026-07-14; fixed in `config.json.tmpl`.
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`force_ssl` only sets an HSTS header — it does **not** redirect, so it can't loop
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behind the nginx→caddy (plain http) hop. It must be `true` or the SPA builds
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`http://` origins on an https page.
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### `general.host` must also match the incoming `Host` header
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Filestash blocks every non-`/admin/` request whose `Host` differs from
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`general.host`, with *"only traffic from X is allowed"* — a 403 that looks like
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an auth failure. nginx forwards the original Host and caddy passes it through —
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don't rewrite it anywhere.
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### The login form only renders at `?action=redirect`
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`GET /api/session/auth/` renders the htpasswd form **only** when
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`action=redirect` is present; any other request falls through to the credential
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check, fails with empty creds, and 303s back to `?action=redirect`. So the real
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form URL is `/api/session/auth/?action=redirect&label=files`. A bare
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`/api/session/auth/?label=files` returning a 303 is **normal**, not a bug.
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### `config.json` is a single-file bind mount → stale inode
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Same shape as the caddy `conf.d` gotcha. The mount pins the **inode**, so
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re-rendering (or a `git pull`) writes a *new* file while the container keeps
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reading the *old* one.
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**After re-rendering: `docker compose up -d --force-recreate filestash`.**
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`restart` is not enough. Rotating the shared password needs a recreate too.
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### Don't set `APPLICATION_URL` or `ADMIN_PASSWORD` env
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Either one makes Filestash **rewrite `config.json` at boot**, which fails against
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the `:ro` mount. Both live in the rendered config instead (`general.host` /
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`auth.admin`). `general.secret_key` must likewise be non-empty, or Filestash
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generates one and tries to save that. With all three set in the file, Filestash
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never attempts a boot write and the `:ro` mount is clean — you get one harmless
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`cannot chmod config file` WARN in the log, and nothing else.
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### The admin console cannot save
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`/admin` loads and its login works, but `config.json` is `:ro`, so every save
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silently fails. That's the deliberate trade for keeping git authoritative
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(drasl/nmsr never write their configs; Filestash does, which is exactly why it
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needs pinning). To change config: edit the `.tmpl`, re-render, recreate. To
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re-derive the schema after an upstream upgrade: run the image locally against a
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*writable* state volume, click it into shape, `docker cp` the result out.
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### The API needs `X-Requested-With: XmlHttpRequest`
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The SPA sends it; anything else (curl, a naive monitor) trips intrusion
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detection and gets a 403 that looks like an auth bug. Only matters when probing
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by hand — the Kuma monitor hits `/`, which is fine.
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### Disk is the shared failure domain
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`FILES_DATA_DIR` grows without a quota, driven by whoever has the password. A
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full disk on `cochi` does not just break `files.` — it takes **Minecraft, Drasl,
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and mc-backup** down with it. Eyeballing is the accepted plan. Revisit (quota,
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separate partition, or a Kuma disk monitor) if the share sees real use.
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### Pinned digest, not `latest`
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`machines/filestash` publishes essentially only `latest`. Unpinned, any
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`docker compose pull` silently ships a new upstream build of an internet-facing,
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writable file manager. Pin the digest; upgrade deliberately — same discipline as
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`NEOFORGE_VERSION`.
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## Deferred
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- **Keycloak SSO** — needs oauth2-proxy + `FILES_AUTH=passthrough`. Not built.
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- **Anonymous access** (`FILES_AUTH=none`) — only once the host is internal-only.
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- **Landing page link** — deliberately none on day one; `plan/18-landing-rework.md`
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is mid-rework, so revisit with WS5 (footer) rather than merging into a moving
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design.
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- **Per-user accounts / roles** — htpasswd RBAC is enterprise-only.
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- **Backups / quota** — none.
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